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N OW that adjustments have been made in the Federal' Tax
laws affecting the concept of community, states that at-
tempted to incorporate the property system solely as a tax saving
device are naturally, departing from the idea.' This seems to be a
wise move, if citizens generally are ignorant of community pur-
poses and the plan is foreign to their thinking and acceptance.
Humanly, they would feel that their accustomed way of reaching
a fair adjustment of the property law of spouses would be better
for the reason, if no other, that it was an accustomed way and for
them, doubtless it would be better as it might take generations to
educate the populace to an understanding of and satisfaction with
any new property law and more particularly with those dealing
with husband and wife. Just as federal tax saving seemed to have
been the primary, if not the sole cause of movements to adopt the
system in states previously without it,' tax saving played a part in
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I Revenue Act of 1948, Public Law 471, 80th Congress, chap. 168, 2nd session. See
also Sec. 351 (eliminating community property provisions of Sec. 811 (e) of the Internal
Revenue Code) ; Sec. 361 (adding the marital deduction provision to Sec. 812 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code) ; and Secs. 104 (c), and 301 (providing for the splitting
of income between spouses by amending Sec. 12 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code).
Rubin and Champagne, Some Community Property Aspects of the 1948 Revenue Act,
9 LA. L. REV. (1948).
2 Oregon adopted system 1943, Chapter 440 Oregon Laws. Repealed system 1945,
Chapter 270, Oregon Laws, p. 409. See also Million, CONSANCIINTY AND AFFINITY IN
Onr.GON, 23 ORE. L. REV., 69 (1944).
Mirhigan adopted the system in 1947 and repealed it in 1948: Michigan Public
Acts, No. 39.
Pennsylvania adopted the system in 1947, Pa. Laws, No. 550, and the provisions were
declared unconstitutional in 1947 by Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
357 Pa. 581, 55 A. (2d) 521.
3 See Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act-A Comparative Study,
2 LA. L. REV. 575 (1940).
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amendments4 and more particularly in the lack of them in states
which had enjoyed deep satisfaction in the system for long periods.
Now, the way is cleared and the time certainly overripe for a
reevaluation and adjustment to changed social and economic con-
ditions in the established community property states. Realistic
property laws in general are obviously most important to the finan-
cial well-being of the state and its greater productivity. Commu-
nity property laws have the added importance of bearing directly
upon the marriage and doubtless affect its sucess or failure. Cer-
tainly, cognizance should be taken of present day conditions gen-
erally prevailing.
Before discussing need for change in Louisiana, it should first
be stated that citizens of Louisiana in general and certainly includ-
ing the writer, believe in the system as a fair, practical and thor-
oughly desirable legal mechanism for governing property interests
of the spouses and their children. Undoubtedly, it should be pre-
served as such and hence suggestions for change are made with a
view to strengthening the system instead of weakening it. Changes
suggested would, in the writer's judgment, prevent dissatisfactions
which conceivably, might in time cause a movement for abandon-
ment of the system as a whole.
Louisiana's first Civil Code was adopted in 1808. The industrial
revolution had not even started. Investments were largely in realty
and its improvement. Women worked in their homes. Obviously
the redactors could not foresee investments in present securities.
They could not conceive of the present army of married women
workers outside their homes.5 They were not troubled by a high
and apparently mounting divorce rate. Whether the last two situa-
tions are related is debatable but in the writer's judgment at least,
4 No. 49 of Louisiana Acts of 1944 amending Art. 1787 of Louisiana Civil Code of
1870. See Discussion, Daggett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944, 6 LA. L. REv. 1, 2-4 and 5
(1944). No. 187 of Louisiana Acts of 1942 repealing Art. 1749 of LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
OF 1870. See Discussion, Daggett, Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code, 5 LA. L. REv. 83,
86 (1942).
5 See Women's Opportunities and Responsibilities, May issue, 1947. The Annuals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
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inequitable spousal property laws may well play a part in caus-
ing marital dissatisfactions leading to divorce.' Whether it is desir-
able to have married women working outside of their homes may
yet be questionable in the minds of certain persons. That they
are doing so is a matter of fact, and apparently they will want
to, or have to continue. Certainly, in view of the major changes
undergone in world affairs, it should not be surprising that laws
relatively static for a long period need adjustment.
EARNINGS OF WIFE
The matter of the wife's earnings has, perhaps, caused recently
more general maladjustment than any other item relating to com-
munity property. Her earnings from an industry "reciprocal" with
that of her husband have long been considered community prop-
erty7 and for the most part her only earnings prior to the general
entrance of women into all types of endeavor outside their homes
were of necessity in a "reciprocal industry."' In 1912, however,
an amendment to Article 2334 of the Revised Civil Code of Louisi-
ana was passed containing the following language:
"The earnings of the wife when living separate and apart from her
husband although not separated by a judgment of court, her earnings
when carrying on a business, trade, occupation or industry separate
from her husband,. .. and the property purchased with all funds thus
derived, are her separate property."
The article was again amended and re-enacted in 19200 but the
passage incorporated in 1912 was not specifically interpreted by
the court until 1933." The decision12 was then reached that only
earnings of the wife accruing when she was living "separate and
6 Reflections on the Law of the Family, Daggett, p. 120, et seq. The Annals, May,
1947.
7 Article 2402 of LOUISIANA REVISED CIVIL CODE OF 1870.
8 See note 5, supra.
9 Act No. 170, Louisiana Statutes of 1912.
10 Act No. 186, Louisiana Statutes of 1920.
11 Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933). See also Byrd v. Babin, 181 La.
466, 159 So. 718 (1935).
12 See Daggett, Is Joint Control Possible? 10 TULANE L. REv. 588, 598 (1936).
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apart" from her husband would be her separate property. The
Chief Justice indicated 8 that the husband might sue his wife for
divorce on the ground of abandonment if he was discontented
with the situation thus suggesting that the living separate and apart
must be of such a nature as to furnish grounds for judicial separa-
tion or divorce because of the wife's behavior. In 1940, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal of the second circuit, 4 following the
previously discussed decision of the Supreme Court, held that
the property purchased by a wife with earnings as a public prosti-
tute was her separate property. The husband was a visitor of the
house of ill-fame, of which the wife was an inmate but the rules
of the house forbade his residing there and he seemed not to have
given his custom exclusively to his wife. The question of which
spouse was "at fault" was not discussed though it appeared that
the husband later obtained a divorce. If the living separate and
apart must be accompanied by cause for judicial separation or
divorce, which is not a settled doctrine, and the "fault" may lie
with the wife, a fortiori it would appear that the wife's earnings
should be her separate property if "the fault" was that of the
husband.
"Piecemeal"' 5 legislation is ever fraught with confusion and
especially when injected into as closely knit and complicated a
legal pattern as that of a community property system. Certainly
the basic idea of community was preserved by this "judicial legis-
lation" as it might be termed and it seems unfortunate that when
the court deleted the greater part of the statute under considera-
tion that they were not able to make a clean sweep of it. The ques-
tion of what constitutes "living separate and apart" is not fully
answered and more importantly, the apparent trend toward the
complete answer is unsatisfactory from a social point of view.
Judicial examination into the marital affairs of spouses in matters
which should be purely property questions seems to be inimical
is Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 266, 148 So. 37, 45 (1933).
14 Small v. McNeely, 195 So. 649 (1940).
15 Holt, Review of 3 Vernier, American Family Laws, 45 YALE L. J. 742, 743 (1936).
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to the welfare of the state and an unwarranted invasion of rights
of privacy. Evidence in most cases of separation of bed and board
and divorce is ugly and unnecessary under modern divorce laws,
and puts on record material that forever stands to humiliate the
parties, their families and friends and most importantly, their chil-
dren, if any. 6 Furthermore, this type of evidence is usually unre-
liable and biased and the whole issue lends itself to fraud, difficult
to detect particularly after the death of one of the spouses as in
the case discussed above and elsewhere17 when the question of
marital "fault" was injected by the court into a property dispute.
In the Code of Hammurapi prepared for the Babylonians dur-
ing his reign 2123-2081 B.C., said to be "the first comprehensive
law-code of which we have any knowledge" faultlessness of the
wife and her guiltlessness in the marriage relation is rewarded
by permitting her then to "Take her dowry and go back to her
father's house." Since we seem to have departed from the rest
of this code, written in eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth language,
it would appear that time is ripe for discard of imponderable fault
and guilt ideas in connection with marital property laws.'"
Alimony
Incidentally, a by product of the community of the wife's earn-
ings produces a highly undesirable social result in certain alimony
awards. In computing the amount of a man's income in order to
arrive at the stipend due his divorced wife, the earnings19 of the
second wife, being community property may be included thus
weakening the chances of success for the second marriage if the
working woman involved be human! Obviously, alimony laws and
not those dealing with community property need repair in this
situation as they do in many others, a discussion not properly with-
in the scope of this paper.
10 See note 6, supra.
11 Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 41 So. (2d) 837 (1949).
18 LEwms BROUNE, THE WoRLD's GREAT SCRIPTURES, 17 et seq. (1946).
19 Article 160, LOUISIANA REVISED CIVUL CODE OF 1870.
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Procedure
Because of influences developing about the time of the first
"World War" there was a widespread movement to recognize
legally the place which women had admittedly taken in the world.
In the United States the 19th Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion giving women the right to vote and a great deal of state legis-
lation were recorded. As a part of this general movement, Louisi-
ana passed a series of so-called married women's emancipatory
acts, which purported to give married women the same rights as
single women had to deal with their property. In the case of mar-
ried women the property with which they might deal was clearly
their separate property, as specific statements in these acts made
them inapplicable to community property." Married women may
pledge their property to pay the debts of their husbands which
might also be debts of the community but may not deal with or
bind the community directly.2' With the growth in numbers of
married women producing wealth outside their homes, property
which falls into the community, the anomalous situation has arisen
in which married women may contract without authorization and
yet their husbands, strangers to their contract, must sue upon these
contracts should need arise, because benefits of the contract would
fall into the community of which the husband is the "head and
master."2 This curious situation seems to have no parallel where
a person completely capable of making a contract cannot sue
upon it."
Torts
The converse is also disturbing. For example, if a married
woman beautician, of whom there seem to be legion, should negli-
20 La. Act 94 of 1916; La. Act 244 of 1918; La. Act 219 of 1920; La. Act. 34 of 1921;
La. Act 132 of 1926; La. Act. 283 of 1928.
2" La. Act 283 of 1928.
22 Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933). See also Vercher v. Roy,
171 La. 524, 530, 131 So. 658, 660 (1930). Roy v. Succession of Vercher, 174 La. 475,
480, 141 So. 33, 34 (1932).
28 Daggett, supra, note 12.
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gently or otherwise, mar the appearance of the customer instead
of improving it, whether or not the damaged individual could
recover against the community is an unsettled question. That a
husband is not liable for the torts of his wife is regarded as well
settled.24 This tort arises out of a contract of employment, how-
ever, the benefits of which flow to the community. The specific
article of the Code permitting a wife to act as agent for the hus-
band or the community requires express authorization.25 The wife
may be employed without the husband's authorization and even
against his will.2 Certainly an estate should not enjoy profits of
employment and have no responsibilities for losses. The wife may
have no separate property and no opportunity to accumulate any.
Her earnings fall into the community. Creditors have no right to
sue for a separation of property." Indeed, the wife may sue only
under very restricted conditions." The wife may in a sense be
responsible for the torts of the husband indirectly, not out of her
separate property but because her earnings fall into the commu-
nity which is under the husband's sole management29 and liable
for his separate and community debts,"0 including, as mentioned
above, alimony " to a previously divorced wife or children of a
different marriage.
Public Merchant
Article 1312 of the Code in effect long before passage of the
married women's emancipatory acts provides than when a wife is
acting as "public merchant" she may bind the community in con-
24 McClure v. McMartin, 104 La. 497, 29 So. 227 (1901).
25 LOUISIANA REVISED CIVIL CODE, Article 1787 as amended by Act No. 49 of 1944.
26 See note 19, supra.
27 Articles 1991, 2433, LouISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870; Cosgrove v. His Creditors,
41 La. Ann. 274, 6 So. 585 (1889).
28 DAGGTr, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA, 59 et seq. (2nd ed.
1945).
2) Id. at 19 et seq.
so Id. at 50 et seq.
1 See note 19, supra.
22 LOUISIANA REVISED CIVIL CODE OF 1870.
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nection with her business and hence the community is responsible
for liabilities while benefitting from profits. At the time of the ac-
ceptance of this article, authorization of the husband was required.
Moreover, the term "public merchant" is a restricted one. It was
extended by the Supreme Court to cover manufacturing."3 Each
additional extension, if any, will necessarily come through litiga-
tion, unless the Legislature should see fit to act.
Automobiles
Liability of the husband and community for damage caused by
the wife while driving a car owned by the community is said to
accrue if the wife is on a community errand, but what constitutes
such an errand as opposed to attendance upon personal affairs
seems to be in grave doubt. In 1949 the court of appeal 4 for the
second circuit decided, apparently against the judge's own inclina-
tion and solely upon the authority of a Supreme Court 35 case that
a wife was upon a merely personal mission when she negligently
caused an automobile accident while returning from procuring a
knitting needle which she needed to make a sweater for herself.
After reviewing lists of cases of opposing views the judge said:
"Were this question res nova before this court on the fact presented it
would be our inclination to hold the husband liable, and such a conclu-
sion would be based upon the premise that the legitimate pursuits of a
wife, whether for wholesale recreation and pleasure or for other pur-
poses consonant with the intangible and imponderable obligations of
the marital relationship should be considered as within the scope of
community activities. But to so hold this instance would be, in our
opinion, to defy the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in the
Golson case.""
Since Louisiana does not accept the "family car" doctrine and
does not compel insurance, an injured person is without relief in
these situations. When the car is furnished by the community and
33Charles Lob's Sons v. Karnofsky, 177 La. 229, 148 So. 34 (1933).
'4 Brantley v. Clarkson, 39 So. (2d) 617 (1949).
"15 Adams v. Golson, et al., 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
36 39 So. (2d) 617, 620.
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driven by a contributing even though not the managing spouse, it
appears that there is little excuse for not holding the community
responsible.
Actions for Damages by Husband
Act 186 of 1920 clearly states the property situation when the
husband is injured. The paragraph incorporated into Article 2334
of the Louisiana Civil Code by this amending act appears as
follows:
"Actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses suf-
fered by the husband, living separate and apart from his wife, by reason
of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his
separate property."
Again, the "fault" idea is injected into a property question, in this
case by the legislature with the highly undesirable social connota-
tions previously indicated.
In passing, it might be observed that under ordinary rules of
statutory interpretation express limitation of the words "living
separate and apart" by the clause "by reason of fault.. ." in this
paragraph would indicate that the limitation was not intended in
connection with the preceding paragraph of the same article, where
the words "living separate and apart" were used in stating the
law governing the wife's earnings. This interpretation was not used
by the court, however, as has been previously shown in the dis-
cussion of earnings of the wife.
Actions for Damages by Wife
Act 68 of 1902, amending Article 2402 of the Revised Civil
Code of 1870 states the property rule in regard to damages to
the wife in the following language:
"Damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form
part of this community, but shall always be and remain the separate
property of the wife and recoverable by herself alone..."
Act 186 of 1920 contains an additional statement which follows
[Vol 1
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the provision dealing with the earnings of the wife and appears
as follows:
". .actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses
and the property purchased with all funds thus derived are her separate
property."1 7
The Court has applied these provisions in a practical manner."8
The desirability of making these funds the separate porperty of
the wife seems questionable as any incapacity of the wife whether
she is occupied as housekeeper or in business certainly causes a
serious economic loss to the community. That the husband may
also recover for the amount of expenditures for medical care,
obviously does not restore the community to its former productiv-
ity while benefitting from the normal efforts of the wife.
Workmen's Compensation
The court has indicated that the workmen's compensation stat-
ute and its distinctive purpose renders it unnecessary to consider
property labels in deciding questions concerning employer-em-
ployee relationships under the act.3" Though compensation for
injury is measured by earnings, the fact that the earnings of a
married woman are community property does not prevent her from
suing since she sues not upon her contract for compensation but
as a result of the law passed for the protection of the employee
and the State.
The classification of the judgment as separate or community
property is another question, as yet undetermined. If emphasis is
placed upon the injury then the property would apparently be sep-
arate. If the compensation for injury be regarded as replacement
of earnings, then it would fall into the community.
A judgment in the husband's favor under the compensation
statute would be his separate property if the injury were empha-
'3 Article 2334 of LouISIANA REvisED CIVaL CODE OF 1870.
38 DAcGFrr, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 250.
39 Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., Inc., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
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sized and he was "living separate and apart from his wife, by
reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or divorce." 0
In all other situations, whether injury or earnings were the criteria,
the judgment would be community property.
Limitations Upon Husbands' Power Over
Community Property
Limitations upon the husbands' control of the community prop-
erty are partly expressed in Article 240441 which is phrased as
follows:
"The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community
of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they
produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the con-
sent and permission of his wife.
He can make no conveyance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of
the immovables of the community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the
movables unless it be for the establishment of the children of the mar-
riage. A gratuitous title within the contemplation of this article em-
braces all titles wherein there is no direct, material advantages to the
donor. Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects by a gratui-
tous and particular title, to the benefit of all persons.
But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common
property, or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his
wife, she may have her action against the heirs of her husband, in sup-
port of her claim in one-half of the property on her satisfactorily prov-
ing the fraud."
Since the word quota, as used in this article has never been
defined in Louisiana, the application of the article is in effect
only to immovables unless fraud may be proved, always a difficult
matter. Justice Hawthorne"2 of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
recently went so far as to suggest the necessity for legislation pro-
viding limitation on the husband's disposition of movables without
proof of actual fraud since investment in more recent times is apt
40 Act 186 of 1920.
41 LOUISLANA REvLsE Cxv. CoDE o 1870.
42 Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. (2d) 118 (1947).
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to be more heavily in movables rather than in immovables, the
converse of the situation existing when this article, purporting to
protect the wife, came into the Law of Louisiana.
In 1920, the Legislature again amending Article 2334 of the
Revised Civil Code provided that:
... when the title to community property stands in the name of the
wife, it cannot be mortgaged or sold by the husband, without her
written authority or consent."
The court has in part defeated the apparent import of this limi-
tation by deciding that neither can the wife sell or encumber the
community property in her name without the husband's consent.4"
Again, if title to property stands in the names of both husband
and wife, the husband alone may sell without the wife's consent."
In 1921,' the Legislature provided that certain property might
be designated as a "family home" by the husband and after
proper recordation of the designation the property might not be
sold or mortgaged without consent of the wife. Moreover, the wife
might make the designation if the husband failed to do so. The
court has limited the effect of this provision probably rightly so
under the facts of the particular case. 6 The limitation on the hus-
band's power seems to be of little practical value.
Thus, the power of the husband to control the property of the
community is practically unlimited, regardless of the amount of
actual material contribution made by the wife to its corpus.
Administration
Article 2386 7 of the Revised Civil Code formerly provided that
when a wife, was administering her separate property alone or
through an agent, who might be her husband," that the fruits from
48 Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932).
44 Young v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166 So. 139 (1936) ; Atwell v.
Vaughn, 186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937).
45 Act 35.
46 Watson v. Bethany, 209 La. 989, 26 So. (2d) 12 (1946).
47 LOUISIANA REvIsaa CIVIL CODE OF 1870.
48 Miler v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
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that property, whether natural or civil, would be the separate prop-
erty of the wife.' 9 If the husband was administering her separate
property by virtue of his office as husband, the fruits of the sep-
arate property would fall into the community.50 Obviously the
question was one of fact. In 1944,"1 to avoid the necessity for
proof and doubtless more specifically to facilitate tax savings, the
Legislature amended the article, providing that the husband would
be considered the administrator unless the wife recorded a notarial
act stating that she intended to administer herself for the benefit
of her separate estate.
The question arises whether once having made the declaration,
the wife would be able to make another one returning the adminis-
tration to the husband. The question has been asked by husbands
contemplating a business venture and wishing the wife's property
and its income to be safe from possible creditors of the future. It
is not as of as much importance as it was before the 194852 change
in the federal income tax law as there would not be the urgent
desire to shift back to community of income should the business
venture prove successful in order to save taxes.
The measure is probably unknown to many husbands and wives
of small income without regular legal advice, who believe that
when the wife is administering her small estate that the income
is safe from community creditors.
What Is Administration?
The line between administration of separate porperty and in-
come, earnings from a "business, occupation, or industry" is a
hard one to define. Before this troublesome question of interpreta-
tion arose, many wives, "administered" large plantations them-
selves or through agents and preserved the income as their separate
property under the law, still unchanged. Would this type of en-
49 DAGGETT, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 38, et seq.
5o Ibid.
51 Act 286 of 1944, La. Statutes; United States v. Burglass, 172 Fed. (2d) 960
(1949).
B2 See note 1, supra.
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deavor be considered "business"? If so, would no part of the
profit be allocated to the capital investment, clearly separate prop-
erty? Tax decisions would not furnish a definite answer as the
court has indicated that those issues are between the government
and the individual, and not between the spouses or their heirs in
settlement of community.53 Federal decisions, of course, do not
bind the state courts in matters of interpretation of local law.
CONCLUSION
It would clearly appear that at its present stage, Louisiana's
community law lacks the clarity and certainty particularly desir-
able in property laws; that the community is unbalanced in certain
particulars; that cognizance of present day economic and social
conditions is not taken and unrealistic and undesirable effects
upon the spouses, the family, creditors, business and the state at
large follow.
Whatever changes in the pattern of the law may be regarded
as desirable and certainly there is room for wide differences in
opinion on substantive matters, that the law should be clarified in
many particulars seems undebatable. Titles are rendered uncer-
tain because of the confusion. Credit and trade are hampered.
Advice to spouses and business alike must be overcautious, full of
warning and hampered with an undue amount of uncertainty.
What might seem to be the trend of fairly recent jurisprudence
is a conscious attempt to repair the unbalance of the community
caused by piecemeal legislation. The interpretation indicating a
correction of the statute dealing with the wife's earnings without
her home has been discussed. A recent case54 dealing with building
and loan association stock again defeats the purpose of a provision
for separate property of the wife. While the label of the statute6
was too clear for avoidance, the court stated that, in final settle-
53 Succession of Land, 31 So. (2d) 609 (1947).
54 Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. (2d) 1 (1948-1949).




ment, the wife's separate estate could not be built up at the expense
of the community. That the husband may have given the wife the
sums invested, which he might legally do, was not discussed. Gifts
to the wife must stand many tests, however, in any case."
Doubtless, the same course will be followed in connection with
money deposited in a bank by the wife, which under the law may
be withdrawn by her without the husband's consent. 7 The provi-
sion has not gained any popularity through the courts interpreta-
tion of it against mineral lessees.5 The legal presumption of com-
munity seems to be more and more difficult to overcome.
Placing everything of gain during marriage whatever the source,
in the community may or may not be the answer. Balance and jus-
tice between the spouses might be achieved as certainly the wife,
making a real contribution within the home works as hard or
harder than does the wife in business or industry. Whether the
contribution has its source in service or money should not matter.
However, the spouses as separate individuals should not be the
sole consideration. The family as a unit and society must be con-
sidered.
For protection to the family, it is highly desirable at times that
all the eggs not always be in one basket. It kills the initiative of
both spouses to so fear that the financial security of the family will
be jeopardized if all is risked, that no venture can be undertaken
for betterment. If spouses might arrange that the job or little
business of the one might not in failure pull down the other, the
personal satisfactions of both might be increased as well as their
economic productivity for the State. A very simple change in the
]aw of Louisiana would make this possible. Full provisions for
the marriage contract and its regulation including the right to
contract for a separate instead of a community regime already
56 Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717. 38 So. (2d) 502 (1949).
5 La. Act 45 of 1902, par. 3; La. Act 189 of 1902, par. 1 (8).
5 Le Rosen v. N. Central Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1931) ; Clingman
v. Devonian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937). But see Jones v. Southern Natural
Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. (2d) 34 (1948).
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exist"' but the contract with one minor exception"0 must be made
before marriage. If the contract was permitted during as well as
before marriage with proper safeguards, thoughtful and energetic
couples could then handle their property in a business-like manner.
Provision for a marital portion already exists that the one dying
"rich" would not leave the survivor "poor," if sufficient property
was not left by will or otherwise."
This provision might be particularly desirable in cases where
the wife is in business and presumably as capable of understand-
ing what she was doing as would the ordinary husband. The basic
idea of a separation of property had family protection in view.
6 2
It may only be sought by the wife however, and then only if the
affairs of the husband are involved, too limited, and too late of
course, for application by intelligent couples attempting to plan
for the future.
Perhaps the greatest present need is for readjustment of the
control provisions. 8 This may be done while retaining the balance
of the community, that an equitable settlement between the spouses
may be made at the dissolution of the community. The complete
control of the community was placed in the husband at a time
when women had limited opportunities for education and even less
for experience in business. Society also vested what amounted
to personal control of the wife in the husband.6 It needs no citation
of authority to show that these several factors have materially
changed. Previous discussion shows the need for change in the
law to meet change in the times that procedure in connection with
a wife's contract of employment be made practical; that creditors
may have a clear and certain course for satisfaction; that innocent
59 DAGErr, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 114, et seq.
30 La. Act of 1910 amending Article 2329, LA. REViSED CIVIL CODE OF 1870.
61 DAcGusrr, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 95.
62 DACGETT, The Wife's Action for a Separation of Property, 5 TULANE L. REV. 55
(1930).
63 DAGGErr, supra, note 12, at 589.
64 Article 2404, REvIsED CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA; State v. Priest, 210 La. 389,'27
So. (2d) 173 (1946).
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third persons may have recourse in case of injury; that society
in general may deal with an individual who is financially as well
as legally responsible in so far as her contracts and torts are
concerned. An invaluable though immeasurable additional benefit
would also accrue to the state in better regulated and better satis-
fied families. The humiliation and indignity suffered by respon-
sible wives, holding responsible positions in government and bus-
iness, while graciously borne for the most part cannot but create
tensions and other non-evident disturbances which in time create
marital and social dissatisfactions with deleterious results to the
individual, the family and society.
Oklahoma worked out a compromise provision which on paper
at least merits examination. In Oklahoma's original act, 65 later
declared unconstitutional because of its "election" feature, 6 the
following provisions appeared:
"The wife shall have the management and control and may dispose of
that portion of the community property consisting of her earnings,
all rents, interest, dividends, incomes and other profits for her sep-
aparte estate and all other community property the title to which stands
in her name. ''6T
"The separate property of the wife and that portion of community prop-
erty, record title to which is in her name or which is under the manage-
ment, control and disposition of the wife shall be subject to debts con-
tracted by the wife arising out of tort, or otherwise, but not to debts or
liabilities of the husband. The separate property of the husband and
that portion of the community property, record title to which is in his
name or which is under the management, control and disposition of the
husband shall be subject to debts contracted by the husband or liabili-
ties of the husband arising out of tort or otherwise, but not the debts
or liabilities of the wife." '
60 Oklahoma Sess. Laws of 1939, chap. 62, Article 2 [OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, §§ 51-65).
11 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 65 S. Ct. 103 (U. S. 1944) .
67 Oklahoma Sess. Laws of 1939, chap. 62, Article 2, § 6; [OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 56].
68 Oklahoma Sess. Laws of 1939, chap. 62, Article 2, § 7; [OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1939) tit. 32, § 571.
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Many of the problems and much of the uncertainty and con-
fusion presently existing in the Louisiana law, instanced above
might be mitigated by a similar device, while preserving com-
munity property for proper division at the time of dissolution of
the partnership. This new approach in control, in keeping with
present conditions of society is realistic enough to satisfy many
of the critics of Louisiana's outworn provisions. 9
There are other weak spots in Louisiana's present patchwork
community property law, not discussed in the space permitted in
this paper, which has sought to highlight the situations in greatest
need of attention.
The Legislature of Louisiana 0 has requested the Louisiana State
Law Institute71 to revise the Civil Code, hence there is hope that an
integrated body of law on the subject, reflecting present day needs
may be thoughtfully prepared in the not too distant future.
69 Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act-A Comparative Study, 2 LA.
L. Rav. 575 (1940).
70 La. Law 335 of 1948.
71 Daggett, The Louisiana State Law Institute, 22 TEx. L. REV. 29 (1943).
